• [ ] Block direct workload egress at the firewall.
  • [ ] Keep the control API on a mode-restricted Unix socket.
  • [ ] Keep the seeded deny-first egress ranges or tighten them.
  • [ ] End egress[] deliberately; fall-through denies.
  • [ ] Put narrow connection and message rules before broad ones.
  • [ ] Treat mitm:false as full encrypted tunnel authority.
  • [ ] Require proxy auth where network source identity is insufficient.
  • [ ] Restrict --trusted-proxies and sanitize forwarded identity headers.
  • [ ] Scope broker sockets, destinations, fields, concurrency, and cache policy.
  • [ ] Leave failOpen false unless availability explicitly outweighs containment.
  • [ ] Never permit brokers to inject framing, hop-by-hop, or proxy-auth headers.
  • [ ] Keep clusterKey separate from Storage and backups.
  • [ ] Alert on forwarding denials, auth failures, broker failures, and rule compile errors.